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PIAAC data are used to evaluate the extent of overeducation in G7 countries. Incidence of 
overeducation is seen to vary systematically with a number of demographic characteristics. 
The impact of overeducation on remuneration is then estimated using quantile regression. 
This impact is observed to be minor, suggesting that while some individuals have 
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capital is nonetheless rewarded. Care therefore needs to be taken in interpreting measures of 
overeducation. 
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The concept of education as a right has a long history. In the seventeenth century John Locke 
(1692, p.29) argued that ‘everyone’s natural genius should be carried as far as it could’.  
While this view has been influential, it begs the question of how that ‘genius’ can be 
evaluated; how can learning be assigned a metric or a value?  No doubt there are several 
dimensions that need to be considered. Amongst these are the contribution that learning can 
make to an individual’s capacity to enjoy life, to contribute to society, and to be economically 
productive.1 In all these respects, education represents an investment – the returns, whether 
they accrue to the individual or to society more broadly, come over a lengthy period 
following a transient upfront cost (of time and money).  
 
A natural extension of this observation has been for economists to analyse education as an 
investment comparable to investments in physical capital that might be made by businesses. 
This involves the comparison of returns – appropriately discounted for time preference – with 
the upfront costs. In this respect, economists’ analysis differs fundamentally from that of 
Locke; investment should continue only as long as the benefit net of costs is positive, not for 
as long as any (gross) benefit at all can be realised.2 If the gross benefit associated with 
education increases with the amount of schooling received, but does so at a diminishing rate, 
the possibility of an individual being overeducated – in the sense that the costs outweigh the 
benefits – arises in the economists’ analysis in a way that it would not arise for Locke. Taking 
into account the costs of education in this way makes overeducation possible even though an 
individual may be capable of learning more.  
 
The argument for including costs in any consideration of the optimal level of education is 
compelling. However they are met – by the individual, by business sponsorship, or by 
government – these costs are a real resource that cannot then be spent on other things. The 
opportunity cost of tuition (whoever pays for it) is the output that teachers (and other school 
resources) and students alike could produce if they were employed in alternative activities. 
Locke’s normative ‘should’, by ignoring these costs, encourages investing beyond the point 
at which the returns (in terms of happiness, contribution to society, and more narrowly 
defined pecuniary returns) justify the expenditure. Where, at the margin, the cost of an 
educational investment exceeds the benefits, it makes sense to describe a situation of 
overeducation.  
 
In some cases, highly educated workers fail to gain employment in which their skills and 
those demanded by their employers are well matched. In such cases, the worker may be 
described as overeducated – though ‘mismatch’ may be a more accurate term, not least 
because this phenomenon is likely to describe a failure of the labour market rather than of the 
market for education. Nonetheless, we shall use the term ‘overeducation’ to describe this 
phenomenon in the present paper.  
 
It is a phenomenon that is of considerable current interest. Turbulence can disturb the 
efficiency of mechanisms that allocate resources within an economy. One of the effects of the 
                                                     
1 The positive relationship between happiness and education has been documented by many authors, including 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2011). Son and Wilson (2011), amongst many others, report a positive association 
between education and volunteering. The impact of education on economic productivity has been analysed in 
thousands of studies, with international evidence recently surveyed by Montenegro and Patrinos (2014).  
McMahon (2009) usefully reports evidence on wider benefits of education.  
2 Early contributions on the economics of human capital include Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964).  
Great Recession of 2008-09 might therefore have been to perturb the matching technology by 
which workers are allocated to jobs, weakening the efficiency of this mechanism.  Well 
qualified workers may, to a greater extent than in the past, be occupying positions in jobs that 
make less than full use of their productive potential. To the extent that their search for more 
appropriate employment is hamstrung by the costs of on-the-job search, this might be 
imposing a supply side constraint on the pace of recovery.  
 
Fortuitously a new source of data offers the promise of throwing new light on this subject. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has co-ordinated a 
survey, the Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), that 
offers researchers an excellent opportunity to assess the stock and the use of skills across 
member states. The application of an identical survey across countries allows comparison 
across systems; this is particularly important in research contexts where the precise phrasing 
of questions across different surveys may subtly affect response. The aim of this paper is to 
use these PIAAC data to investigate a number of dimensions of the overeducation issue. In 
particular, we focus on the distributional issues, asking the research question: to what extent 
do the returns to surplus education vary across the distribution of workers? Confronting 
this question with data drawn from a number of countries is novel and is an important 
endeavour. While we know that rates of return to education – and to overeducation – vary 
across countries, and we also know that income distributions differ across countries, we have 
not till now known anything about how these effects interact. In particular, it is important to 
establish whether, lurking behind the averages, mismatch presents a particularly severe 
problem in certain contexts. It turns out that it does. 
 
The term ‘overeducation’ is used in this paper while recognising that it is an example of 
loaded vocabulary. It is clearly closely related to ‘underemployment’ (in at least some of its 
forms) and, as noted above, to labour market mismatch. Green and McIntosh (2007) provide 
an excellent discussion of how mismatch can lead to employers complaining of skill 
shortages even while it is apparent that many workers possess qualifications in excess of 
those needed to do their work. Viewed from this perspective, measures that appear to reveal 
the considerable extent of overeducation rather betray a mix of poor reporting and inefficient 
allocation mechanisms in the labour market – and not necessarily a problem with education 
itself. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews the salient 
literature. This is followed by a section that describes the data used in the empirical analysis, 
then the empirical analysis itself, and then finally a conclusion.  
 
 
The Importance of Overeducation 
 
An early contribution to the literature on overeducation is that of Freeman (1976) who 
observed a declining rate of return to education over the early 1970s.3 This period coincided 
                                                     
3 The rate of return to education is the interest rate at which the present discounted value of the stream of future 
earnings premia due to education is brought equal to the cost of acquiring that education. A relatively high rate 
of return implies that education is highly remunerative. If the rate of return on education exceeds that which may 
be obtained on other investments (for example, if it exceeds the interest rate available on savings held in a 
bank), then education is a relatively worthwhile investment. Hence the falling rate of return observed by 
Freeman was a matter of concern; a rate of return falling below that obtainable from alternative investments 
with a reduction in demand for highly educated scientists following the Apollo landings and 
Vietnam war. As it turned out, the diminution of the rate of return proved to be ephemeral, 
but interest in the idea that the supply of highly educated labour could outstrip demand, 
thereby putting downward pressure on the relative wage paid to skilled workers, remained. In 
the United Kingdom, Brynin (2002) analysed data from both the Labour Force Survey and 
the British Household Panel Study, and found that increased graduate density (due to a higher 
proportion of young people undertaking higher education) lowered the gap between graduate 
and non-graduate earnings. Since the returns to education follow a distribution, some non-
graduates earn more than graduates. 
 
This literature has led to various approaches being taken to the study of overeducation, these 
being usefully surveyed by Groot and van den Brink (2000), McGuinness (2006), and Leuven 
and Oosterbeek (2011). The various approaches are all based on an attempt to identify the 
minimum educational requirements for each occupation, but they use different means to 
obtain this information. The various methods have produced markedly different estimates of 
the extent of the problem, and it is important therefore to understand the peculiarities of each. 
 
The first method is based on direct inquiry of workers of the educational requirements 
associated with their job; many surveys include questions about this, and indeed this is the 
approach taken later in the present paper. Early examples of such an exercise include the 
work of Rumberger (1987) and Sicherman (1991), both of whom find evidence that the 
extent of overeducation was high in the USA at the time of their analysis. Sicherman, for 
instance, finds some 40 per cent of workers to be overeducated.  This figure, while high, is 
not out of line with findings from other time periods and other countries. Indeed, recent work 
by Holmes and Mayhew (2015, p14), drawing upon the European Social Survey, reports that 
almost 60% of graduates in the UK are in non-graduate jobs; the proportion is yet higher in 
Greece and Estonia.4 
 
The second method involves the use of administrative lists of occupational titles. For 
example, O*NET, sponsored by the US Department of Labor (http://www.onetonline.org/), 
provides a classification of occupations that is accompanied by information, for each 
occupation, on educational requirements.  A typical example of the use of such data in the 
context of overeducation research is that of Van der Meer (2006), who, using two such 
measures, finds overeducation rates in the Netherlands in the region of 30%.  
 
A third approach, pioneered by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) involves defining, for each 
occupation, required education by reference to the distribution, across workers, of educational 
attainment. If years of education are, say, one standard deviation or more above the mean for 
the occupation in question, then a worker is said to be overeducated. This approach has 
obvious appeal in instances where a direct measure of job requirements is absent. It has, 
however, been widely criticised in the literature, not least because of the arbitrary nature of 
the one standard deviation cut-off point (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011), and because (since 
the mean changes) it does not permit analysis over time or across cohorts (Flisi et al., 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
suggested that (based on the evidence of the observable economic data) too much resource was being invested in 
education and not enough elsewhere.  
4 Further influential examples of this approach include Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Dolton and Silles 
(2008). The latter paper highlights the sensitivity of estimates of overeducation to the precise question asked of 
respondents – specifically whether they are asked about the level of education required to do a job or to get a 
job. Another recent exercise has been conducted by Foley and Brinkley (2015), again finding high incidence of 
overeducation in the UK.  
The method has typically yielded estimates of overeducation that are somewhat lower than 
those obtained using the other approaches. 
 
It should be noted that a degree of arbitrariness surrounds any measure of required education 
obtained by the above methods. Many occupations could be undertaken, albeit not very well 
and at low levels of productivity, by minimally educated workers. The definition of a 
minimum acceptable level of productivity in each occupation is essentially arbitrary. A good 
discussion of these issues is provided by Green et al. (1999). Inevitably then, researchers are 
left to employ a working definition that is not altogether satisfactory. The high estimates of 
the rate of overeducation observed in some studies – including this one – should be viewed 
with this in mind. This being the case, comparison of rates of overeducation (or 
underemployment, or mismatch) across demographic groups or across time is likely to be a 
more useful exercise than any focus on the absolute level. 
 
Further caution in interpreting apparently high rates of overeducation at face value comes in 
the work of Duncan and Hoffman (1981), who revisit Freeman’s approach by investigating 
the way in which overeducation affects the rate of return to schooling. They find that workers 
whose educational attainment exceeds that required for their job earn a positive rate of return 
on those years of schooling that are surplus to those required for the job, though this rate is 
lower than that associated with their schooling up to the required level. This finding begs the 
question: if the rate of return on surplus schooling exceeds the external rate of return that may 
be earned (for example) by depositing money in a bank, the term ‘overeducation’ may itself 
be a misnomer – even when defined in narrow economic terms. It is also consistent with the 
definition of a required level of educational attainment for each occupation being an arbitrary 
judgement often at odds with the statistical evidence on how, within a given occupation, 
education affects productivity.5 In a recent paper, Abel and Deitz (2016) have directly 
investigated the skill content of jobs occupied by US college graduates who have self-
identified as underemployed; they find that while 45 per cent of graduates deem themselves 
to be underemployed, fewer than 10 per cent are in low-skilled service jobs. Subjective 
measures of underemployment, or overeducation, seem therefore to be upwardly biased. 
 
Evidence on the rate of return to education (for example, Walker and Zhu, 2011) confirms 
that, in the UK as in other developed economies, this return remains fairly high. To be sure, 
such estimates are based on the experience of the average graduate, and are not necessarily 
consistent with the experience of prospective students who are at the margin of deciding 
whether or not to continue in education. This question has, however, been addressed through 
the estimation of quantile regressions which suggest that it is uncommon, even at the lowest 
deciles of the distribution, for the rate of return to education to fall below the external rate of 
return (Martins and Pereira, 2004).6 Using a similar approach, Bender and Roche (2017) 
analyse US data, and show that, particularly for those whose jobs and qualifications are 
severely mismatched, the penalty attached to overeducation is greatest for those at the lower 
end of the wage distribution.  
                                                     
5 In the years following publication of Duncan and Hoffman’s paper, several further studies likewise examined 
the returns associated with overeducation. A notable example is that of Borghans and de Grip (1999), which in 
turn draws on the work of Hartog (1985) that uses concepts of overeducation in an attempt to evaluate human 
capital theory.  
6 The issue of heterogeneity is shown to be important by Maier et al. (2003), who find that while, for the typical 
overeducated worker, the returns to overeducation are positive, there is considerable variation across 
individuals. Other work using quantile regression approaches includes Gaeta et al. (2018) which focuses 
specifically on Italian PhD holders.  
To summarise, discussion of overeducation has focused largely on issues of match in the 
labour market. Where an individual has been educated up to a level that exceeds that required 
for the job, that individual is said to be overeducated. But the required level is an arbitrary 
construct, demonstrably so since we know that workers earn high returns on their surplus 
education (albeit not as high as on their required education). We also know that, of the UK 
respondents to PIAAC that report themselves to be overeducated, the vast majority do, at 
least to some extent, use advanced skills in their work.7 Nonetheless, since returns do fall 
somewhat once the required education threshold is passed, the threshold – and so the concept 
of overeducation - is meaningful. Workers who are currently in jobs for which some of their 
education is surplus to requirements could likely earn higher returns in more demanding 
occupations. Surplus education reflects an investment that may be performing well relative to 
investments outside the sphere of education, but less well than educational investments where 
workers succeed in efficiently matching their skills and occupations. Moreover, even where 
the returns to surplus education are, on average, positive, heterogeneity of experience across 
individuals may well mean that for some workers the surplus education represents a poor 
investment.  
 
In the remainder of the paper, we use a new data set to throw light on the issue of 





PIAAC provides an immensely rich set of information on individuals’ education, skills and 
work experience. This data set has the considerable advantage of providing, in a standard 
format, data across a large number of developed countries.8 To focus specifically on major 
economies, we examine data for the G7 countries with the exception of Canada (where, for 
reasons of data availability, it is not possible to construct an indicator for overeducation). In 
each country, PIAAC gathers data on at least 4500 respondents, all aged between 16 and 65, 
but since some of these are not in work at the time of the survey the sample size used in the 
present analysis is somewhat smaller. The data collection method used in each country 
resulted in samples that mirror the population imperfectly; this feature is corrected for in the 
present analysis by weighting the data appropriately, using weights provided in PIAAC itself.  
The results reported below are therefore based on samples representative of the population of 
16-65 year olds within each country.  
 
The countries included in the present study all participated in the first round of PIAAC, for 
which data were collected between 1 August 2011 and 31 March 2012. The data of interest 
concern individual respondents, and these are surveyed at just one point in time, thus 
providing a cross-section of data. The absence of longitudinal data at the level of the 
individual precludes the use of fixed (or random) effects models to control for time-invariant 
unobserved factors.  
 
                                                     
7 Advanced skills are here defined by writing or reading reports and/or articles, calculating costs or budgets, 
preparing graphs or tables, using simple algebra or more advanced maths/statistics. While the PIAAC data sets 
contain direct measures of certain skills obtained by testing respondents, we deem measures the skills that are 
actually used at work to be more pertinent in the determination of labour market outcomes. 
8 The PIAAC data have previously been used to examine overeducation, a notable study being that of Flisi et al. 
(2014). An analysis specific to one country, namely Spain, by Nieto (2014), has in common with the present 
study the estimation of wage equations; qualitatively her findings are similar to those reported in the sequel. 
We define an individual to be overeducated if they have qualifications at a higher level than 
those that the individuals themselves report as being required for their job, or if they meet the 
qualification requirement exactly but deem the requirement to be a higher level of education 
than is actually needed to do the job.9 Note that interpretation of the measure of 
overeducation derived in this way is subject to the observation that job requirements are, to 
some extent at least, arbitrary. Our main focus in the sequel, however, is on how this measure 
varies across countries and across demographics within each country; assuming any bias in 





In the top row of Table 1, the percentage of individuals in work who are overeducated in their 
current job is reported for each of the six countries under study. There is some variation 
across countries, with Italy standing out as having a smaller proportion than elsewhere of the 
working population reporting themselves to be overeducated.10 
 
The incidence of overeducation, on this measure, is high. Indeed, in three of the countries 
(slightly) more than 50% of workers report that they are overeducated, and even in Italy the 
incidence of overeducation exceeds one third. The lower incidence of overeducation observed 
in Italy is consistent with evidence on labour market matching; for instance, the OECD 
(2012, p.34) reports that the Beveridge curve, which plots vacancy rates against 
unemployment rates at different points in time, is closer to the origin – indicating a more 
effective matching technology between unemployment and vacancies - in Italy than in many 
other countries. While many respondents doubtless do not use everything they learned in their 
highest level of education, the broader set of skills they required at that level is indeed 
relevant to their job. Thus the absolute value of this measure is less informative than the way 
in which the measure varies across demographics. 
 
The remaining rows of Table 1 report the incidence of overeducation amongst various 
subgroups. There turns out to be considerable variation between these groups, even within 
one country. For example, in Italy, more than half of young workers (aged 16-24), but only 
26% of older workers (aged 50 or above), are overeducated.11 The longer workers are in the 
                                                     
9 To be specific, this involves comparison of the responses to the following questions: ‘Which of the 
qualifications on this card is the highest you have obtained?’; ‘Still talking about your current job: if applying 
today, what would be the usual qualifications, if any, that someone would need to get this type of job?’; 
‘Thinking about whether this qualification is necessary for doing your job satisfactorily, which of the following 
statements would be most true?’. Note that, if the answer to the last of these is: ‘a lower level would be 
sufficient’, the individual is deemed overeducated if he or she has exactly the usual qualifications required to get 
the job. Other measures of overeducation may be derived from the PIAAC data. Flisi et al. (2014) provide a 
comparison. 
10 Brynin and Longhi (2009) likewise find evidence of a relatively low incidence of overeducation in Italy, and 
it appears that the difference between Italy and other countries is concentrated at the lower end of the 
distribution of educational attainment. Pastore (2017) has documented the difficult and prolonged nature of the 
school-to-work transition in Italy, and – given the impact that this has on actual work experience at any given 
age – this may contribute to explaining the low rate of self-reported overeducation in this country. At degree 
level, meanwhile, Brynin and Longhi find little variation across countries, and this likely explains why other 
studies focusing on Italy have not identified unusually low rates of overeducation when focusing on graduate 
level data (see, for example, Gaeta, 2015; Caroleo and Pastore, 2017).  
11 The education levels attained by the adult population in Italy is much lower than in the other countries studied 
here, making overeducation relatively unlikely in that country (OECD, 2016, Table A.1.1). Other work in the 
Italian context emphasises that overeducation is a relatively new phenomenon in that country, affecting recent 
labour market, the more opportunity they have to change jobs and secure a better match 
between their skills and the demands of their occupation. This effect is apparent in all 
countries studied here, but appears to be much stronger in Italy than elsewhere.  
 
The incidence of overeducation appears to fall, albeit not monotonically in every country, as 
occupational status rises. This result is unsurprising as it is less likely that workers in more 
demanding roles are overprepared for those roles. The variation across occupations is 
particularly pronounced in France and Italy. This may in part reflect the timing of the survey; 
for most countries, the data were collected in late 2011 and early 2012, though in France they 
were collected later in 2012. Both Italy and France were slower than other countries in our 
analysis to recover from the 2008-09 recession, and they were, at the time that the PIAAC 
data were collected, the countries with the highest unemployment rates, and were also the 
only countries in which unemployment was still rising.  
 
Just as overeducation is least likely for those in the least demanding occupations, it is most 
likely to be observed amongst those with the strongest background of educational 
qualifications. Again the relationship is not monotonic, and indeed it is reversed in the case of 
France. For those who reached a level of education at which they specialised in one subject, 
overeducation is least prevalent amongst those who studied medicine – a subject that has a 
highly vocational orientation. In most countries it is highest for those who studied the social 
sciences.  
 
Tenure with the current employer is negatively associated with overeducation. This may be 
because employers learn about their workers’ skills over time, and so workers gradually 
move to positions within the firm that suit their capabilities. Or it might be that, where the 
mismatch between worker and firm is severe, workers tend to leave the firm after a relatively 
short period. The direction of causality is therefore unclear, with both arguments reinforcing 
the negative association between tenure and overeducation. Likewise, there is (in most 
countries) a negative relationship between workers’ age and overeducation. This may reflect 
a tendency for workers to find appropriate employment over time. It may, equally, however, 
reflect a cohort effect whereby more recent cohorts of entrants to the labour market are more 
likely than earlier cohorts to be overeducated. Unfortunately, without access to panel data, it 
is difficult to see how these two effects can be disentangled.  
 
Workers with supervisory responsibilities are less likely to be overeducated than others. This 
effect is particularly strong in Italy.  
 
There is some evidence of a firm size effect, with the incidence of overeducation falling as 
company size increases. This might reflect a tendency for larger firms to be able to employ a 
more efficient division of labour, employing specialists solely to undertake specialist duties. 
This reduces the incidence of mismatch. The finding might also reflect the efficiency of 
human resource management mechanisms in larger firms. 
 
With one important exception, immigration has little impact on the likelihood with which an 
individual is overeducated. In Italy, however, native workers are markedly less likely than the 
population as a whole to report themselves as being overeducated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
graduates rather than the population across the whole age distribution (Di Pietro and Urwin, 2006). Furthermore, 
it is likely that examining overeducation at national level conceals significant regional differentials in Italy 
(Iammarino and Marinelli, 2015).  
Finally, parental education (as measured by an indicator that at least one parent has 
experienced higher education) has no systematic effect on an individual’s propensity to be 
overeducated.  
 
The above consideration of descriptive statistics is helpful in highlighting broad patterns in 
the data, but a more rigorous treatment allows us to identify which patterns are statistically 
significant. To this end, panels A and B of Table 2 report marginal effects obtained by logit 
analyses of a model that links the various explanatory variables identified above to the 
dependent variable of overeducation.12 The two panels of this table differ in the handling of 
higher education as an explanatory variable – in panel A, higher education appears as a 
binary variable, while in panel B there are binary variables for each subject specialism at this 
level of education. 
 
While the results obtained using this analysis are broadly in line with those that emerge from 
inspection of the descriptive statistics, some patterns are worthy of particular emphasis.  
 
One of the puzzles that emerged from the earlier analysis was the reversal, in the case of 
France, of the common finding that overeducation rises with the level of education. The logit 
results in Panel A throw some light on this. Relative to the excluded category (no 
qualifications)13, it is the case that in France, as elsewhere, education raises the likelihood of 
being overeducated. Nevertheless, there does appear to be an unusually high propensity for 
those educated to lower secondary level in France to report being overeducated. 
 
The logit results (in both panels of the table) confirm our earlier findings that the incidence of 
overeducation tends to fall as occupational status increases. In countries where the relevant 
data are available, tenure with an employer serves significantly to reduce overeducation, 
significantly so in most cases. Once other factors are controlled for, gender appears to be a 
significant determinant of overeducation in two countries. Interestingly, though, the sign of 
the marginal effect differs across these countries, indicating that men are more likely than 
women to be overeducated in Japan, but less likely in Germany. The fall in the propensity to 
report being overeducated as firm size increases is apparent, at some levels at least, in most 
countries, but is not significant in the case of the UK or Germany. Native workers are 
significantly less likely to report themselves as overeducated than are immigrant workers in 
France, but the country of birth effect is not significant in any other country. Having at least 
one parent with higher education reduces the incidence of overeducation in the UK and 
Japan, but elsewhere the effects are insignificant. 
 
The results reported in Panel B, for the most part, confirm that overeducation is more likely 
to be experienced by those schooled to higher levels. This is unsurprising inasmuch as such 
                                                     
12 The logit model is due to Berkson (1944), and has been extensively used since. It provides a means of 
statistically estimating the parameters of an equation where the dependent variable is binary. Least squares 
regression is not appropriate in this context because we wish to constrain predicted values of the dependent 
variable to the unit interval. The logit method achieves this by modelling a latent variable that lies between - 
and , and transforming this variable so that values that lie above or below a cutoff correspond to values of 1 or 
0 of the binary variable. The marginal effects reported in the table are evaluated at mean values of the 
explanatory variables, and indicate the impact of a marginal change in the corresponding variable on the 
likelihood of an individual being overeducated.    
13 One of the education categories has to be excluded from the vector of explanatory variables used in the logit 
analysis; otherwise the sum of the dummy variables representing the various levels of education would equal 
one, and this would result in perfect collinearity with the constant term in the equation. This collinearity would 
render the model intractable.   
workers possess a greater stock of schooling that can be underutilised. The coefficient 
associated with a medical specialism is lower than that on the other subject variables in every 
country, reflecting the highly vocational nature of studies in this area – graduates of higher 
education programmes in medicine are less likely than other higher education graduates to 
experience overeducation. This effect is smallest in the United States. 
 
Having examined the ways in which the incidence of self-reported overeducation varies with 
respondents’ characteristics, we now proceed to investigate what effect this overeducation 
has on remuneration – and, by extension, on workers’ productivity in the labour market.14 In 
so doing, we follow the lead of Duncan and Hoffman (1981). The received literature suggests 
that some, but not all, of the wage benefits of education are eradicated if a worker is 
overqualified for the job. Table 3 thus reports the results of regressions of the log hourly 
(gross) wage on a vector of explanatory variables typical of those used in the literature on 
earnings functions, including also binary indicators to signal whether or not the respondent is 
overeducated; two such indicators are used – one attaches to those respondents with higher 
education and the other to those who completed education at upper secondary level.15 The 
table reports equations for the UK, France, Italy and Japan, these being the countries for 
which wage data are available in PIAAC.  
 
The results are very much in line with those of other studies. There is an inverse–u shaped 
relationship between experience and earnings, peaking at 32 and 34 years respectively in the 
UK and France. In Italy and Japan, meanwhile, the coefficients suggest that earnings rise 
monotonically with experience, with the curve becoming flatter at the top end of the age 
distribution. Higher levels of education result in higher wages in each country, though the 
impact on wages of secondary education in Japan is statistically insignificant. Supervising 
other workers results in a large premium on pay – particularly large in the case of Japan. 
Finally, there is a strong effect of firm size on wages, with larger firms paying more than 
smaller employers.  
 
Of crucial importance in the context of this study is the coefficient on the ‘overeducated’ 
variables. In all countries, the wage effect of overeducation is negative. Importantly, 
however, in most countries, higher education graduates who deem themselves to be 
overeducated still receive, on average, a higher wage than do workers who quit education 
after secondary level. Education still adds to productive capacity and to remuneration, even if 
this education is surplus to the level required to do the job.  This confirms the central finding 
                                                     
14 Kampelmann et al. (2016) have recently argued, and provided evidence to show, that where wages are largely 
standardised within an occupation (rather than being determined by worker characteristics) the impact of 
overeducation on productivity is likely to be greater than that on wages. 
15 Mincer (1974) provides the framework for models of this kind. Following his work, statistical models 
designed to explain wages have almost universally included as explanatory variables measures of labour market 
experience, experience squared, and educational attainment. The rationale for the central role played by these 
variables is that they capture the acquisition of skills (or ‘human capital’) – either directly through instruction or 
by learning on-the-job. The dependent variable is logged in order to ensure that the model does not produce 
implausible negative predicted values of the wage; a further advantage of transforming the wage in this way is 
that the coefficients can be easily interpreted as the proportional increase in wage resulting from a unit change in 
the corresponding explanatory variable. In an earlier version of the paper, a series of dummy variables 
indicating respondents’ occupations was also included in the set of explanatory variables; these are omitted here 
in order to avoid collinearity with the education variables, but we note that there was no qualitative difference in 
the results. In contrast to many other surveys, PIAAC has the benefit of a direct measure of employment 
experience (which is what we use here) – the relevant survey question is: ‘In total, approximately how many 
years have you had paid work? Only include those years where 6 months or more was spent in either full-time 
or part-time work.’  
of Duncan and Hoffman (1981), and cautions against interpreting overeducation as evidence 
of wasted investment. The United Kingdom is, however, an exception – here those who are 
overeducated do not appear to have a wage advantage over their colleagues.16 Of the 
countries studied here, it has, by some distance, the highest first time graduation rate, 
suggesting that there may indeed currently be an oversupply of graduates in that country 
(OECD, 2016, p.68).   
 
Regressions of the kind reported above are based on best fit principles, and in effect describe 
the experience of a typical worker. Individuals who suffer a pay penalty associated with 
overeducation are, arguably, likely to be drawn from the tail of the distribution, however. 
Consequently a quantile regression analysis is more likely (than an analysis of average 
behaviour) to pick up any deleterious effects of overeducation.17 To this end, we report in 
Table 4 the results of quantile regressions analogous to those reported in Table 3. These 
confirm that, though there is some variation in coefficient magnitudes, the impact of 
overeducation is – at least in the case of France, Italy and Japan – small in relation to the 
gains that can be made from higher levels of education. We conclude therefore that, while 
many workers may have qualifications that exceed those required by their jobs, these workers 
are typically remunerated at higher levels than their colleagues who just satisfy the 
requirement – and that this result applies equally to workers who, by virtue of being in the tail 
of the distribution, are most likely to be overqualified. 
 
While the results reported in Table 4 show how all coefficients in the model vary across the 
distribution, it is instructive to focus specifically on the coefficients on the overeducation 
variables – both for those with higher education and those with upper secondary education – 
and to study how these vary across all centiles of the wage distribution. These coefficients are 
shown graphically, by country, and for centiles between the 10th and 90th, in Figures 1 
through 4. The results show marked differences across countries. In each country, the penalty 
associated with overeducation is, at almost all points, greater for those with higher education 
than for those with only upper secondary education; this is unsurprising since there is scope 
for a greater gap between the level of qualification and the demands of the job in the case of 
the former group. There is some evidence that in the UK and France those at the bottom end 
of the wage distribution suffer a smaller penalty than those at the top – in France the change 
is gradual, while in the UK the profile is quite flat except at the extremes. In Italy and Japan, 
meanwhile, the pattern of coefficients across the wage distribution is more complex. For 
those with higher education the coefficients follow an inverse-u shape (especially pronounced 
in Italy) – so that the pay penalty first falls and then rises as we move up the wage 
distribution. But beyond the 70th centile the pay penalty falls sharply. For workers in Japan 
whose highest qualification is at upper secondary level, the pattern of pay penalties due to 
overeducation is the reverse of this – first rising, then falling before rising sharply at the top 
end.  
 
                                                     
16 In this case, for those with higher education, the fall in wage due to overeducation reduces the wage premium 
to a level below that attached to upper secondary education. 
17 Quantile regression allows a regression line to be separately estimated at different points of the distribution of 
the dependent variable rather than, as in least squares regression, just at the mean. Comparison of the results at 
different quantiles allows us to assess the extent to which the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable might vary across the distribution.. The idea of evaluating parameters at points other than the 
mean has a long history, but because the methods are computationally burdensome it is only recently that 
quantile regression has come to be commonly used. A good introduction is provided by Koenker and Hallock 
(2001). Applications in the context of overeducation include Martins and Pereira (2004) and McGuinness and 
Bennett (2007). 
The variations across the distributions noted above are interesting, but should be viewed in 
the context of, for the most part, fairly low magnitudes of the pay penalties. The results for 
Italy are in some respects the most interesting. Recall that the incidence of overeducation in 
this country is relatively low. But Figure 3 shows that some of those who have received 
higher education and who are overeducated suffer a substantial pay penalty – notably those 
below the 15th centile and those between the 70th and 80th centiles. Low incidence of 
overeducation should not therefore necessarily imply that overeducation should not be a 





The concept of overeducation generates considerable public and media interest, not least 
because it suggests a wasted investment. On a number of grounds, however, the extent of 
such waste is likely to be exaggerated by conventional measures. For reasons of data 
availability, the focus in existing studies (including the present one) is on the narrow 
economic returns to education, and wider social benefits are typically ignored.18 Furthermore, 
respondents to surveys may under-report the extent to which their education is useful in their 
jobs simply because they do not use all their learning in their work. Nevertheless, the 
regularities observed in the data tables reported above suggest that our measure of 
overeducation is capturing some real phenomenon, even though there is ambiguity about 
what that might be.  
 
Moreover, even when viewed in purely economic terms, the concept of overeducation does 
not sit comfortably with mainstream models of the labour market. In the human capital 
model, individuals invest in education up to the point where the internal return falls to the 
level of returns obtainable through other investments, and their education contributes directly 
to increased productivity. It is not clear in this model why people should not invest rationally. 
There may be distortions to the market – for example, students may have limited information 
and hence make poor choices in deciding to prolong their education – but these are rarely 
pointed out as sources of overeducation, though arguably they should be. As participation 
rates in higher education have risen, many secondary school students have viewed 
progression to study at degree level as the norm, and their choice in continuing with their 
studies is arguably made in the absence of perfect information about returns (Rolfe, 2002; 
Dill and Soo, 2004).  
 
In fact, the evidence suggests that in most contexts, where workers have qualifications that 
exceed those deemed necessary to undertake their jobs, the surplus education contributes to 
enhanced productivity. The results obtained in the present paper suggest that the UK may be 
an interesting and important exception – and indeed the finding that it is exceptional serves to 
highlight the value of comparative study. In all the countries we have examined, however, 
surplus education does prove to be less productive than the education that is required to 
perform the job – there is a kink in the rate of return at the point of required education. The 
kink is worthy of study in its own right, since it indicates that overall productivity could be 
increased by reallocating workers to jobs that more closely suit their stock of human capital. 
The potential for social and economic benefits to be realised in this way has generally been 
underappreciated by policy-makers (McGuinness et al., 2017), and the work reported in the 
                                                     
18 Some of these are considered by Green and Henseke (2016). 
present study suggests a number of demographic determinants for the position of this kink 
relative to the stock of human capital that people have. 
 
Of especial interest – indeed the main novelty of this paper – is the extent to which the 
penalty attached to surplus education varies across workers, and the extent to which any such 
variation differs across countries. In particular, it is instructive to investigate whether workers 
at the bottom end of the distribution pay a higher penalty for overeducation than do others. 
Quantile regression analysis suggests that, for most countries analysed here, any such effect 
is either absent or minor; those with higher education in Italy are an important exception.  
 
While overeducation is typically evaluated by reference to skills needed to perform tasks at 
work, the goals that society sets for education are broader. It is commonplace for politicians 
to make statements about what schools should or should not do, though these do not 
necessarily in any way connect to productivity at the workplace.19 So long as there is tension 
between the way in which overeducation is evaluated and the goals set by society for 
education, it is inevitable that measures of overeducation will overstate the perceived 
‘problem’. Yet, given that they signal mismatch between the supply and demand for skills in 
the labour market, and given that they do have implications for the efficiency of investment 
of real resource in education, the analysis of how these measures vary across demographics 
remains useful. The access that PIAAC gives to internationally comparable measures  
enhances our understanding of this phenomenon, and further analysis of updated PIAAC data 
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Table 1 Percent overeducated, total and by subgroup 
 UK Germany France Italy Japan USA 
overeducated 50.7 42.5 53.5 34.1 52.1 49.6 
Male 48.0 38.9 53.3 31.8 54.8 49.5 
Female 52.0 45.9 53.7 36.2 49.7 49.7 
Managerial/professional/technical 48.4 36.7 39.1 17.8 40.4 46.6 
Clerical 48.7 43.9 54.7 24.9 57.2 52.7 
Sales 54.5 50.7 69.7 54.8 58.2 52.0 
Manual 47.7 45.6 71.7 52.1 61.7 53.3 
Higher Education 68.1 43.8 44.0 33.8 58.4 58.5 
Upper Secondary 50.6 43.3 55.4 31.3 48.1 40.9 
Lower Secondary 55.4 33.5 63.1 39.5 38.9 46.0 
Arts specialism 52.7 39.0 55.1 33.5 55.5 60.8 
Social science specialism 59.2 49.1 55.7 36.6 61.2 56.2 
Science specialism 53.9 39.8 50.4 33.2 57.3 52.6 
Medical specialism 41.5 31.1 42.0 15.7 30.6 50.6 
Tenure up to 5 years with current 
employer 
57.0  59.8 47.8 55.3  
Tenure over 5 years with current 
employer 
45.0  49.4 27.1 49.6  
Age 16-24 58.9  65.2 54.2 50.3  
Age 25-49 53.3  54.8 36.2 52.9  
Age 50+ 39.9  47.5 26.3 51.5  
Supervisory responsibility 50.6 35.3 42.3 19.2 47.2 47.1 
Firm size 1-10 53.5 45.6 59.7 45.2 55.7 54.4 
Firm size 11-50 51.2 44.3 56.1 30.6 52.8 49.3 
Firm size 51-250 49.0 38.7 52.2 29.8 52.9 51.4 
Firm size 251-1000 50.2 41.7 47.5 21.4 46.2 43.6 
Firm size over 1000 45.9 40.7 38.8 19.7 43.8 46.8 
Native 51.1 41.8 53.1 29.2 52.2 49.6 
Parent with higher education 48.4 44.1 52.3 34.5 51.3 50.8 
Note: Continuous data for age and tenure are not available for Germany and the USA, these 
variables being measured in bands for these countries. Data for the subgroup representing 
those with  (at most) ‘primary or no formal qualifications’ are not reported owing to small 
numbers of observations in this subgroup. 
  
Table 2 Panel A Logit results on overeducation: marginal effects 
 UK Germany France Italy Japan USA 
Managerial/professional/technical -0.1944 -0.1848 -0.2787 -0.4064 -0.3651 -0.2469 
 (4.05)* (6.74)* (10.74)* (11.84)* (13.92)* (7.36)* 
Clerical -0.1461 -0.0688 -0.1663 -0.2439 -0.1096 -0.0741 
 (2.91)* (2.24)* (4.82)* (9.33)* (3.33)* (1.65) 
Sales -0.0296 -0.0007 -0.0334 -0.0608 -0.0674 -0.0367 
 (0.63) (0.02) (0.99) (1.81) (2.28)* (1.07) 
Supervisor 0.0120 -0.0889 -0.0650 -0.0932 -0.0152 -0.0171 
 (0.32) (4.09)* (2.96)* (3.06)* (0.64) (0.70) 
Firm size 11-50 -0.0395 -0.0056 0.0236 -0.0170 -0.0498 -0.0760 
 (0.92) (0.21) (0.89) (0.54) (1.92) (2.43)* 
Firm size 51-250 -0.0361 -0.0500 -0.0073 0.0064 -0.0367 -0.0702 
 (0.76) (1.77) (0.26) (0.18) (1.30) (2.16)* 
Firm size 251-1000 -0.0087 -0.0083 -0.0381 -0.0913 -0.0976 -0.1425 
 (0.15) (0.26) (1.19) (2.04)* (2.82)* (3.96)* 
Firm size over 1000 -0.0948 -0.0183 -0.0857 -0.0534 -0.1069 -0.1295 
 (1.54) (0.50) (2.28)* (0.98) (2.44)* (3.34)* 
Native 0.1303 -0.0568 -0.0192 -0.2335 -0.2263 0.0029 
 (1.88) (1.72) (0.58) (4.87)* (1.31) (0.09) 
Parental education -0.1172 0.0266 -0.0127 0.0126 -0.0443 -0.0115 
 (2.39)* (1.26) (0.47) (0.22) (1.98)* (0.48) 
Experience 0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0008 0.0006 
 (0.31) (2.37)* (1.85) (1.96)* (0.77) (0.68) 
Tenure -0.0039  -0.0043 -0.0049 -0.0025  
 (1.89)  (3.56)* (2.77)* (2.18)*  
Lower Secondary 0.5424 -0.2273 0.6158    
 (10.00)* (1.99)* (6.83)*    
Upper Secondary 0.5137 -0.0886 0.5029 0.1016 0.1440 0.0165 
 (9.26)* (0.58) (8.19)* (2.85)* (5.13)* (0.38) 
Higher Education 0.5844 0.0191 0.5813 0.3485 0.3837 0.3272 
 (16.73)* (0.12) (5.87)* (6.17)* (14.33)* (7.63)* 
Male -0.0480 -0.0720 0.0107 -0.0465 0.1284 -0.0050 
 (1.37) (3.45)* (0.53) (1.62) (6.04)* (0.22) 
       
N 3109 3269 3475 2051 3313 2841 
Log-pseudolikelihood -3.61 -0.26 -0.41 -0.21 -0.15 -0.06 
Note: This table reports marginal effects, with z values in parentheses, and an asterisk 
denoting significance at better than 5%. For binary variables, the marginal effects reported 
are those associated with a change from zero to one; for continuous variables, the marginal 
effects are for a unit increase at the mean value. Numbers of respondents without 
qualifications are small in Italy, Japan and the USA, and so the excluded category of 
education includes lower secondary as well as those without qualifications. Other categorical 
variables excluded from this specification to preclude collinearity (and thus forming a 
baseline) are: manual occupations; working in small firms employing 10 workers or fewer; 
non-native workers; those for whom neither parent undertook higher education; and females. 
See also notes to Table 1. 
  
Table 2 Panel B Logit results on overeducation: marginal effects 
 UK Germany France Italy Japan USA 
Managerial/professional/technical -0.0181 -0.1895 -0.2730 -0.3328 -0.2288 -0.2235 
 (0.39) (6.63)* (10.46)* (10.48)* (8.67)* (6.83)* 
Clerical -0.0405 -0.1180 -0.1614 -0.2265 -0.0410 -0.0554 
 (0.84) (3.80)* (4.65)* (8.13)* (1.28) (1.22) 
Sales 0.0503 -0.0233 -0.0245 -0.0543 -0.0185 -0.0262 
 (1.18) (0.75) (0.72) (1.57) (0.65) (0.75) 
Supervisor 0.0451 -0.0904 -0.0575 -0.0834 -0.0086 -0.0123 
 (1.27) (4.09)* (2.59)* (2.73)* (0.37) (0.51) 
Firm size 11-50 -0.0067 -0.0072 0.0305 -0.0163 -0.0416 -0.0695 
 (0.17) (0.26) (1.15) (0.50) (1.64) (2.19)* 
Firm size 51-250 -0.0227 -0.0494 0.0023 0.0186 -0.0090 -0.0604 
 (0.49) (1.74) (0.08) (0.51) (0.33) (1.83) 
Firm size 251-1000 0.0125 -0.0153 -0.0215 -0.0811 -0.0744 -0.1277 
 (0.24) (0.47) (0.66) (1.71) (2.15)* (3.55)* 
Firm size over 1000 -0.0292 -0.0251 -0.0574 -0.0324 -0.0915 -0.1142 
 (0.49) (0.67) (1.49) (0.58) (2.10)* (2.92)* 
Native 0.0799 -0.0682 -0.0087 -0.2631 -0.1941 0.0123 
 (1.28) (2.05)* (0.27) (5.40)* (1.00) (0.37) 
Parental education -0.0804 0.2267 -0.0229 0.0597 -0.0040 -0.0005 
 (1.64) (1.25) (0.84) (1.02) (0.19) (0.02) 
Experience -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0045 -0.0020 0.0001 
 (1.27) (1.62) (1.67) (2.67)* (1.98)* (0.17) 
Tenure -0.0043  -0.0050 -0.0048 -0.0031  
 (2.25)*  (4.16)* (2.64)* (2.75)*  
Lower Secondary 0.0865 -0.3121 0.1359    
 (2.30)* (11.14)* (4.80)*    
Upper Secondary 0.0061 -0.1420 0.0615 -0.0916 -0.0787 -0.1799 
 (0.15) (5.54)* (2.09)* (3.13)* (3.42)* (7.03)* 
Male -0.0479 -0.0782 0.0031 -0.0533 0.0705 -0.0057 
 (1.36) (3.41)* (0.15) (1.83) (3.08)* (0.23) 
Arts specialism 0.0624 -0.1587 0.1835 0.1891 0.1026 0.2031 
 (1.37) (3.86)* (5.38)* (3.65)* (3.53)* (5.77)* 
Social science specialism 0.1626 -0.0160 0.1327 0.2408 0.1536 0.1582 
 (3.67)* (0.47) (4.24)* (4.51)* (5.08)* (4.64)* 
Science specialism 0.1034 -0.1262 0.0636 0.1635 0.1232 0.1428 
 (2.36)* (3.90)* (2.51)* (3.83)* (4.44)* (4.40)* 
Medical specialism -0.0188 -0.2108 -0.0214 -0.0186 -0.1123 0.1290 
 (0.27) (6.30)* (0.57) (0.27) (2.80)* (3.33)* 
       
N 3109 3269 3475 2051 3313 2841 
Log-pseudolikelihood -3.91 -0.26 -0.41 -0.21 -0.16 -0.06 
Note: This table reports marginal effects, with z values in parentheses, and an asterisk 
denoting significance at better than 5%. For binary variables, the marginal effects reported 
are those associated with a change from zero to one; for continuous variables, the marginal 
effects are for a unit increase at the mean value. Numbers of respondents without 
qualifications are small in Italy, Japan and the USA, and so the excluded category of 
education includes lower secondary as well as those without qualifications. Other categorical 
variables excluded from this specification to preclude collinearity (and thus forming a 
baseline) are: manual occupations; working in small firms employing 10 workers or fewer; 
non-native workers; those for whom neither parent undertook higher education; and females. 
See also notes to Table 1. 
  
 Table 3 Wage equations (dependent variable is the log of the hourly gross wage) 
 UK France Italy Japan 
Experience 0.0255 0.0272 0.0116 0.0211 
 (6.12)* (11.08)* (2.34)* (5.87)* 
Experience2 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (4.48)* (6.26)* (0.41) (2.86)* 
Higher education 0.6386 0.7362 0.4869 0.3150 
 (5.66)* (5.59)* (11.86)* (6.95)* 
Upper secondary 0.2807 0.3982 0.1349 -0.0037 
 (7.72)* (3.04)* (4.78)* (0.09) 
Lower secondary 0.2120 0.3173   
 (5.89)* (2.43)*   
Overeducated in higher ed. -0.3831 -0.1301 -0.2131 -0.1985 
 (3.15)* (5.01)* (3.48)* (5.74)* 
Overeducated in upper sec. -0.0834 -0.0461 -0.1180 -0.0977 
 (2.79)* (2.70)* (3.77)* (2.45)* 
Supervisor 0.1555 0.1275 0.1928 0.3478 
 (5.04)* (8.61)* (6.42)* (12.16)* 
Firm size 11-50 0.0780 0.0495 0.1705 0.0923 
 (2.08)* (2.42)* (5.20)* (2.28)* 
Firm size 51-250 0.1469 0.0997 0.2423 0.2001 
 (3.92)* (4.67)* (6.53)* (5.40)* 
Firm size 251-1000 0.2404 0.1228 0.2097 0.3325 
 (4.47)* (4.76)* (4.35)* (7.25)* 
Firm size over 1000 0.2523 0.2293 0.2401 0.4818 
 (5.96)* (7.54)* (4.76)* (7.45)* 
Constant 1.5479 1.6808 1.9923 6.6383 
 (27.60)* (12.60)* (43.98)* (139.77)* 
     
N 2962 3236 1696 3093 
R2 0.1898 0.3039 0.3132 0.1839 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage. No data on wages are 
available for Germany or the USA. t values are in parentheses. See also notes to Table 2. 
Table 4 Wage equations – quantile regressions (dependent variable is the log of the hourly gross wage) 
 UK 
.25          .50          .75            
France 
.25          .50          .75            
Italy 
.25          .50          .75            
Japan 
.25          .50          .75            
Experience 0.0214 0.0267 0.0293 0.0271 0.0214 0.0232 0.0246 0.0219 0.0150 0.0089 0.0186 0.0341 
 (7.41)* (11.64)* (9.03)* (11.85)* (10.38)* (11.12)* (6.93)* (5.23)* (2.84)* (4.11)* (8.29)* (10.85)* 
Experience2 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 
 (4.36)* (7.29)* (7.06)* (7.68)* (5.35)* (4.99)* (3.89)* (2.75)* (0.58) (1.42) (2.80)* (5.56)* 
Higher education 0.4484 0.4747 0.5239 0.4622 0.6323 0.7044 0.4550 0.4435 0.5959 0.3057 0.3540 0.3138 
 (6.92)* (15.04)* (6.63)* (4.99)* (4.86)* (19.54)* (13.94)* (11.03)* (10.61)* (10.84)* (13.95)* (7.42)* 
Upper secondary 0.2153 0.2867 0.2729 0.2282 0.3506 0.3495 0.1384 0.1254 0.1655 0.0300 0.0369 0.0025 
 (6.41)* (8.91)* (6.78)* (2.44)* (2.70)* (10.12)* (5.21)* (4.99)* (4.86)* (1.58) (1.65) (0.07) 
Lower secondary 0.1368 0.1913 0.1997 0.1484 0.2651 0.2566       
 (4.14)* (5.87)* (6.40)* (1.61) (2.05)* (7.75)*       
Overeducated in higher ed. -0.2387 -0.1839 -0.1827 -0.0921 -0.1342 -0.1438 -0.2205 -0.2077 -0.2469 -0.2071 -0.2086 -0.1764 
 (3.53)* (3.50)* (2.03)* (4.14)* (5.38)* (4.91)* (3.02)* (3.04)* (3.85)* (7.21)* (8.33)* (5.56)* 
Overeducated in upper sec. -0.0578 -0.0980 -0.0813 -0.0463 -0.0475 -0.0630 -0.1575 -0.1249 -0.1110 -0.0575 -0.0986 -0.0660 
 (2.96)* (5.08)* (2.66)* (2.55)* (2.99)* (3.59)* (5.40)* (4.87)* (3.15)* (3.00)* (4.44)* (2.00)* 
Supervisor 0.1506 0.2128 0.2256 0.1116 0.1225 0.1166 0.1178 0.1502 0.2513 0.3197 0.3160 0.2751 
 (6.21)* (11.16)* (8.21)* (7.39)* (9.09)* (6.99)* (5.15)* (4.48)* (6.91)* (13.24)* (15.69)* (10.66)* 
Firm size 11-50 0.0292 0.0411 0.0161 0.0307 0.0457 0.0199 0.1808 0.1666 0.1110 0.0714 0.0805 0.1001 
 (1.28) (1.92) (0.46) (1.53) (2.77)* (1.09) (5.78)* (5.44)* (2.98)* (3.86)* (3.91)* (3.03)* 
Firm size 51-250 0.1065 0.1078 0.1113 0.0760 0.0707 0.0594 0.2644 0.2278 0.1327 0.1381 0.1969 0.2182 
 (4.50)* (4.11)* (2.50)* (3.85)* (4.10)* (2.71)* (7.66)* (6.88)* (2.72)* (6.15)* (7.39)* (5.86)* 
Firm size 251-1000 0.1941 0.2011 0.1952 0.0939 0.1167 0.0842 0.1966 0.2253 0.0582 0.3205 0.3591 0.3545 
 (7.36)* (8.00)* (5.11)* (3.95)* (5.92)* (3.90)* (4.82)* (5.23)* (1.18) (7.32)* (11.01)* (8.90)* 
Firm size over 1000 0.2651 0.2317 0.2341 0.1644 0.2442 0.2070 0.1822 0.2386 0.2339 0.5108 0.5650 0.5435 
 (7.93)* (11.32)* (3.19)* (5.69)* (8.29)* (6.64)* (5.47)* (3.73)* (3.80)* (10.39)* (14.95)* (15.08)* 
Constant 1.4508 1.4898 1.6488 1.7463 1.8088 1.9855 1.6969 1.8746 2.1610 6.5237 6.6205 6.7657 
 (35.90)* (41.53)* (32.65)* (18.63)* (13.89)* (60.84)* (47.81)* (47.17)* (45.88)* (301.14)* (258.92)* (150.06)* 
             
N 2962 2962 2962 3236 3236 3236 1696 1696 1696 3093 3093 3093 
Pseudo R2 0.1712 0.2144 0.1925 0.1643 0.2106 0.2381 0.2236 0.2131 0.2075 0.1462 0.2261 0.2383 
Note: See notes to earlier tables. 
  
    
 
  
